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Abstract 
Evidence from literature suggests that resource-rich countries tend to experience poor economic performance 
relative to economies that are not rich in natural resources. One reason for poor performance is that natural 
resource revenue s volatile due to price fluctuations. Another reason is that resource rents lead to poor economic 
management n countries without appropriate policy safeguards. Stabilisation funds are increasingly being used 
by resource-rich countries to mitigate the effects of volatility. As a major exporter of crude oil, Nigeria is one of 
the countries that has established, and still operates a stabilisation fund. However empirical evidence has also 
shown that the existence of a revenue stabilisation fund does not in itself guarantee good economic performance, 
and that underlying political and economic factors influence the establishment and operation of stabilisation 
funds. This paper identified the political and economic factors that have influenced the functioning of Nigeria’s 
Excess Crude Account. Drawing from relevant literature the paper explain the ways in which (1) the structure of 
the Nigerian federation and (2) the patterns of political interactions between the federating units on the one hand 
and major political actors on the other have affected the operation of the country’s stabilisation fund. The study 
also analysed the ways that non-political (i.e. economic) factors have affected the operation of the fund. The 
paper found that the greatest challenge to effective functioning of Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account has been 
Nigeria’s federal system where the constitution not only prescribes fiscal federalism, but also specify how all 
revenue accruing to the federation should be disbursed. Thus the fund currently operates somewhat ‘illegally’ 
and at the mercy of diverse stakeholders, who have shown little incentive to formalise the rules and ensure fiscal 
discipline.  The study therefore proves that stabilisation funds cannot in themselves change political institutional 
conditions which exist independent of the funds. The paper proposes the establishment of formal rules backed by 
legislation through a constitutional amendment, with clear provisions that would bind political stakeholders. The 
paper also recommends that Nigeria should take advantage of its improving non-oil GDP situation to delink 
government spending from oil revenue in the long run. 
Keywords: Stabilisation fund; national revenue fund; sovereign wealth fund; Excess Crude Account; revenue 
volatility; natural resource revenue; budget-smoothening; procyclical policy; fiscal federalism. 
 
Introduction 
According to the literature of natural resource revenue, resource rich countries seemed to have recorded poor 
economic performance relative to economies that are sustained by non-resource revenues. This, it is argued, is 
due largely to the distortions created by volatile revenue sources and poor fiscal management by governments in 
these countries. As a tool for better management of natural resource revenue, stabilisation funds have become 
increasingly popular among resource rich countries. Also evident in the literature is the argument (based on 
empirical studies) that these resources in themselves do not guarantee better management of the economy by 
resource-rich countries (Truman 2007; Humphreys and Sandbu (2007), and that other (political and economic) 
factors are crucial to the effectiveness of stabilisation funds. 
As a major exporter of crude oil, Nigeria is one of the countries that has established, and still operates a 
stabilisation fund. Nigeria provides a relevant case analysis for understanding the ways in which economic and 
political factors affect the performance of such funds. Drawing from relevant literature, this essay will attempt to 
explain the ways in which (1) the structure of the Nigerian federation and (2) the patterns of political interactions 
between the federating units on the one hand and major political actors on the other have affected the operation 
of the country’s stabilisation fund. The study will also analyse the ways that non-political (i.e. economic) factors 
have affected the operation of Nigeria’s fund. The study will conclude by considering some of the 
recommendations (in the literature) that are relevant to operation of Nigeria’s stabilisation fund, given the 
country’s political context. 
 
Stabilisation Fund: Concept and operation 
A stabilisation fund is generally described as a mechanism for setting aside some proceeds of a country’s 
resources for future use. It is defined as “an instrument intended to smooth revenue streams from natural 
resources and bring more predictability into the country’s budget” (Bagattini 2011). The literature on the subject 
explain the logic of the stabilisation funds in terms of (1) volatility of revenue from extractive resources and (2) 
the finite nature of these resources (see Moss 2011; Eifert, Das et al (2011); Asfaha, 2007; Bagattini 2011). 
Liuksila et al (1994) provided a more technical illustration of this logic in terms of adopting policy tools that 
treat natural resource reserves as stock of assets to be managed rather than revenue sources to be exploited. 
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Similarly, Prior et al (2011) likened revenue from non-renewable sources to the depletion of wealth, thus arguing 
that such revenue should be made available to future generations through savings funds. 
However, according to literature, the mere existence of a stabilisation fund does not in itself guarantee good 
economic performance. The bigger issues to address are the underlying reasons for poor performance by these 
countries in the first place (Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth 2002; Bagattini 2011). A further investigation of mineral 
dependent countries that have set up stabilisation funds have produced, at best, mixed results in terms of 
economic performance (Asfaha 2007; Bagattini 2011). Drawing from these empirical results, these authors argue 
that the reason for the less than satisfactory economic performance by mineral dependent countries can be found 
both in terms of the level of political development of these countries (pre-mineral discovery) and the manner in 
which the existence of oil rents, for instance, have shaped the nature of political business i.e. political institutions 
in these countries. Eifert, Gelb and Tallroth (2002) summarised it thus: “Just as political traditions shape the use 
of oil rents, rents shape the political economy of petroleum exporting nations”. 
 
Nigeria: Fiscal Management Pre-Stabilisation Fund 
As one of the world’s largest producers, oil currently accounts for more than 90 percent of Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings (EIU 2012) and about 75 percent of total revenue (IMF 2011). However, Nigeria has 
experienced long periods of poor economic performance, mostly attributed to poor economic management. 
Davies et al (2001) noted that, before 1995, “Nigeria had various types of extra budgetary funds that were 
financed by oil revenues and used for off-budget expenditure”. By this time, this type of expenditure had grown 
from 4 to 12 per cent of GDP, and more than a third of the annual budget. The country had a huge debt to GDP 
ratio and foreign reserves at just $3.7 billion (CBN 2000). 
 
Establishment of the Excess Crude Account 
In 2004, Nigeria established an “Excess Crude Account” (ECA) in order to “manage revenue volatility and 
improve the conduct of fiscal policy” (IMF 2010). The ECA is “an oil revenue fiscal rule based on a budget 
benchmark” which sets the price of crude oil and exchange rate at a level below the projected market price and 
rate. Any price above the benchmark results in “excess” revenue which is subsequently transferred to the ECA at 
the Central Bank in the name of the three tiers of government (IMF 2011). The ECA is a savings and 
stabilisation fund aimed at curtailing expenditure, smoothening revenue and saving for the future. The fund is 
managed by the Federal Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Nigeria. Withdrawals from the fund is 
authorised by the Federation Accounts Allocation Committee (FAAC) comprising the Federal and states 
governments, and disbursements are routinely publicised in the monthly press releases by the committee. For 
reasons that will become evident in the course of this essay, the fund operates entirely on informal, voluntary 
rules adopted by the Federal Government, 37 state governments and 774 local governments. 
 
The Political and Economic Environment 
While the importance of rules to the effectiveness of a stabilisation fund has been stressed by the literature 
(Humphreys and Sandbu 2007; Bagattini 2011), a formal rule for the Excess Crude Account was not, and can 
still not (it appears) be established due to constitutional impediments. The Constitution of Nigeria (1999) clearly 
prescribe that the country’s revenue should be paid into a “Federation Account” and be shared among the three 
tiers of government according to a predetermined formula. As it is, this remains one of the major challenges of 
the ECA to date (IMF 2011). 
With the establishment of the Excess Crude Account, all earnings above the price benchmark are 
transferred to the fund on behalf of the Federal Government, 37 state governments and 774 local governments, 
while withdrawals are expected (based on the informal, voluntary understanding between the stakeholders) to be 
made from the fund to finance budget deficits. However, since the expenditure pattern of each of the 812 (federal, 
states and local) units of governments is independent of the others, deficits and/or surpluses do not occur 
uniformly across the levels. A close analysis of the country’s financial records show that even in 2008 when all 
three levels of government each recorded a deficit, the ratio of the federal government’s share of the deficit was 
about half the ratio of its share of revenue from the federation account; the proportion of the state governments’ 
deficit, as a percentage of total, was more than twice (63.3%) the percentage of its share of revenue (26.32); the 
local governments, on the other hand, recorded a deficit of just 2.2% of total deficits compared to the fact that 
there are entitled to 21.6% of funds originating from the common pool revenue/savings account. from the 
federation account. These figures clearly show that the size of each unit’s deficit (as a proportion of aggregate 
deficit) varied widely from the corresponding revenue allocation ratios (see CBN Annual Reports 2008). The 
implication, therefore, is that whenever withdrawal from the Excess Crude Account has to be made to finance a 
deficit by any one or more of the federating units, an allocation (of the funds) must be made to every other 
member of the federation corresponding to its share of the funds to ensure equity and fulfil constitutional 
provisions. 
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As a result, one finds that withdrawals were still made from the Excess crude account even when there was 
aggregate (net) budget surplus. 
Operating as a “financing fund”, (receiving surpluses and financing deficits) it would appear that one way 
to address the wide variation in government expenditure pattern is to adopt the solution proposed by Davies et al 
(2001), that financing funds are most effective when the “fiscal policy operates in a sound medium-term 
framework”. However, a close look at Nigeria’s fiscal management in the last few years, especially in relation to 
the operation of the Excess Crude Account (ECA) shows a different kind of result: In 2007, the federal 
government adopted a Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) as part of Nigeria’s financial 
management reforms (See Nigeria: Federal Ministry of Finance 2010). It therefore adopted a multi-year 
budgeting framework which was designed to smoothen expenditure over a three-year fiscal period. During this 
period (2008 through 2010), the government consistently stated in each of annual fiscal reports that its policies 
were guided by its “commitment to the Medium Term Expenditure Framework” (CBN 2008, 2009, 2010). 
However, a close examination of the federal government’s accounts shows that aggregate expenditure increased 
by 32.2 per cent, almost as much as the increase in its aggregate revenue (36.8 per cent) (Central Bank of Nigeria 
Annual Reports 2008). What happened the following year (2009) indicated that the government’s fiscal 
management is driven more by procyclical policies than its stated objective of a smoothening framework. In the 
said year, aggregate revenue and expenditure of all three tiers of government (Local, State and National 
Governments) moved in the opposite direction (decrease) by 16.6 and 8.4 percent respectively. The next year 
(2010), aggregate revenue and expenditure increased by almost equal amounts (14.4 and 15.3 per cent 
respectively). The reality, again, stems from the difficulty in applying fiscal rules in a policy environment where 
fiscal federalism prevails. 
It would also appear that the present situation reflects the point made by Bagattini (2011) that, in the 
absence of effective safeguards, National Revenue funds would in themselves become problems rather than 
solutions. In Nigeria’s case, it would appear that the existence of the Excess Crude Account have tended to both 
encourage each unit of government to spend beyond its means and a disincentive to consider necessary 
adjustment in adverse economic conditions. In the first case, an analysis of the financial reports since the 
establishment of the Excess Crude Account shows that even in the period that actual revenue has exceeded 
budgeted revenue, funds were still withdrawn from the Excess Crude Account (See IMF Article IV Report 2010). 
In its annual reports, the Central Bank of Nigeria justified these withdrawals on the grounds of “intervention in 
priority sectors of the economy” (CBN 2008). These kinds of ‘interventions’ show that, in 2009 for instance, two 
supplementary budgets were passed in the course of the year, in addition to the main budget at the beginning of 
the year. The IMF (2011) attributes this to the difficulty in implementing the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA 
2007), which seek to formalise the “voluntary” oil revenue-based fiscal rule. According to the IMF (Article IV) 
report, the FRA, passed by the National assembly, is not legally binding on the governments at sub-national 
levels. On the other hand, the 80/20 rule, established by the federating units, requires that 80 per cent of the 
savings made in the previous year should be distributed to all tiers of government “regardless of movements in 
world oil prices” (IMF 2011). 
This situation leads directly to the political economy point, made by Hallerberg (2009), that “greater 
centralisation of the budget process increases fiscal discipline”. Owing to the difficulty in binding the 
subnational government to the Fiscal Responsibility Act passed by the federal legislature, IMF (2011) noted that 
attempts to domesticate the Law by the 36 states houses of assembly have so far been unsuccessful, as the state 
legislatures have shown little interests in adopting this legislation since 2007. 
Presently, steps taken by the Federal Government to ‘diversify’ the fund by establishing a Sovereign Wealth 
Fund is being challenged at the Supreme Court by the state governments (The Punch 2012). 
 
Measuring the Performance of the Excess Crude Account 
The analysis so far has highlighted the economic and political conditions under which Nigeria’s Excess Crude 
Account has operated, with some indications as to the effectiveness of the fund in achieving key fiscal objectives 
of government. Bagattini (2011) offered several assessment criteria for measuring the effectiveness of 
stabilisation funds. One of these is the debt sustainability measure as a percentage of GDP. The IMF (2011) 
returned a favourable assessment for Nigeria, with the ratio at the time of report stable at 2.2%. Bagattini (2011) 
also referred to a significant improvement for Nigeria in a study comprising 12 oil-producing countries. 
However, it is also important to consider Chalk’s (1998) observation that, in the assessment of sustainability, the 
relevant indicators may lie beyond some of these indicators, as a sudden, momentary surge in revenue would 
produce misleading results in these indicators. Bagattini (2011) alluded to this when he observed, in his study, 
that Nigeria’s one-off settlement of its external debt stock of more than $30 billion affected significantly, not just 
its debt-GDP position, but also the cumulative score for the 12 countries that were covered in the study. 
As indicated by Budina and Sweder (2008) and Bagttini (2011), an important measure is the composition 
and growth of the non-resource component of GDP. So far, the IMF (2011) and the Central Bank of Nigeria 
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(2011) have reported positive figures, with current growth in non-oil GDP rising at 7.5% and projected to be 
higher. Taken together with the IMF (2011) observation that Nigeria’s (1) successful settlement of its entire 
foreign debt stock (2) ability to weather the global economic recession and to (3) provide huge bailouts for its 
banks, are all testament to the success of the excess crude account. 
From the analysis of Nigeria’s national accounts (CBN Annual Reports), it would seem however, that a 
claim to sustainability would be more challenged by the size of the Excess Crude Account. While the body of 
literature on the optimal size of stabilisation funds portray a practical dilemma in finding the right balance 
between holding large reserves (the opportunity cost of doing so) and investment spending, it is difficult to not 
admit that a large fund was instrumental to Nigeria’s ability to effectively address significant multiple challenges 
almost at the same time. Whether or not the optimal size debate is resolved one way or the other, the point made 
by Bagattini (2011), that funds should be able to serve the twin functions of stabilisation and savings, seem to fit 
more the sustainability argument. This means therefore, that there should be a net positive flow of funds to and 
from the account. While the Excess Crude Account grew steadily between 2004 and 2008 peaking at $22 billion, 
even after the huge debt settlement (CBN 2008), there has been overall negative flow since. At the last report on 
government finances (CBN 2010), the account stood at $3.1 billion. 
It is also worth pointing out that huge income inequality has also exerted serious pressure on the Excess 
Crude Account. In 2010, for instance, the government finally bowed to sustained pressure from organised labour 
and civil society to triple the national minimum wage, which, until that time, was fixed at 7,500 (about $50) per 
month. Funds for the payment of the new wages was withdrawn from the Excess Crude Account (CBN 2010). It 
is hardly surprising that increased allocation to the three tiers of government has persisted, as the wage increase 
is now backed by legislation. 
 
Reasons for Earlier Successes: The Leadership Variable 
One important point to note, which is separated from the previous political economy analysis in order to 
underscore its significance, is the way in which different executive presidents from the same ruling party and 
subject to the same democratic constitution have produced different results with respect to the management of 
the Excess Crude Account. During the tenure of the previous president (2003-2007), the fund was established 
and built up significantly, in spite of strong opposition from the other units of government and civil society on 
the grounds that the account was “unconstitutional”. This was also achieved in in spite of the fact that the 
National Assembly has consistently raised the oil benchmark in the appropriation act and the resultant threat to 
override the president’s veto and even threats of impeachment. Remarkably, the same Minister of Finance, who 
was instrumental to the fiscal discipline in the previous regime, has expressed frustration at the steady depletion 
of the fund (ThisDay 2012), even though she has been given additional sweeping responsibility as the 
“coordinating minister for the economy”. This illustration is remarkably consistent with Hallerberg’s (2009) 
position that the fiscal management effectiveness of finance minister is contingent on the support of the chief 
executive and the relative power of that chief executive within the cabinet. But then, again, it points to the fact, 
stressed by Hellerger (2009), that institutions rather than individuals determine “the likelihood that actors will 
indeed interact repeatedly” in the pursuit of stated fiscal goals. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay has tried so far to analyse the operation of Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account and the way in which 
political and economic factors have affected the effectiveness of the fund. As the analysis has shown, the greatest 
challenge to effective functioning of the fund has been Nigeria’s federal system where the constitution not only 
prescribes fiscal federalism, but also specify how ALL revenue accruing to the federation should be disbursed. 
So the Excess Crude Account currently operates (somewhat ‘illegally’) and at the mercy of diverse stakeholders, 
who have shown little incentive to formalise the rules and ensure fiscal discipline. While the variation in the 
performance of the fund between the earlier and later (current) periods points to the effectiveness of leadership 
ability, it also makes a compelling case for formal rules backed by legislation. The obvious recommendation 
would point, therefore, to a constitutional amendment with clear provisions that would bind political 
stakeholders. However, recent experience with the federal government’s medium-term fiscal policy framework 
and the Fiscal Responsibility Act offers little hope of a commitment to a decisive constitutional amendment by 
the political actors. The reality of the management of Nigeria’s ECA illustrates, in a striking way, Bagattini’s 
position that, expanded political participation in the process is not necessarily a good thing. Still, some hope lie 
in the fact that other sustainability possibilities, like Nigeria’s improving non-oil GDP situation, can be actively 
promoted by the federal government and global institutions. Overall, this study shows further concrete proof that 
stabilisation funds cannot change political institutional conditions which cannot be changed otherwise. 
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